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IN THE INTEREST OF R. C., MINOR CHILD: THE COLORADO
ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION BY DONOR STATUTE AND
THE NON-TRADITIONAL FAMILY
I. INTRODUCTION
Artificial insemination' is modern reproductive technology's old-
est 2 and most common technique.3 It has long been used as an
alternative to adoption, to treat infertility, to prevent the transmission of
genetic defects or diseases, and to overcome physical limitations that
make intercourse impossible. 4  Artificial insemination by donor
("AID") 5 has a confusing and inconsistent legal history.6 Currently,
only thirty-one states have passed legislation governing AID. 7 Typically
this legislation addresses only the most traditional factual situation:
where a woman (1) is inseminated by a physician; (2) with the sperm of
an anonymous donor; (3) after first obtaining her husband's consent.
8
There are many variations of this traditional scenario. For example,
the AID recipient may be unmarried, and she may intend to remain a
single parent. Or she may wish to self-inseminate in the privacy of her
home. Additionally, the recipient may prefer to obtain the semen from a
1. Artificial insemination is a method of conception in which a woman is impreg-
nated by an injection of semen into her vagina, cervical canal or uterus.
2. The earliest artificial insemination in a human was performed in 1790 by John
Hunter, a Scottish surgeon. Kern & Ridolfi, The Fourteenth Amendment's Protection of a Wo-
man's Right To Be a Single Parent Through Artificial Insemination by Donor, 7 Women's Rts. L.
Rep. 251, 252 n.4 (1982). However, there are indications that the possibilities of artificial
insemination were considered by the Hebrews as long ago as 220 A.D. Note, Artificial
Insemination: Donor Rights in Situations Involving Unmarried Recipients, 26 J. FAM. L. 793, 794
(1987-88) (citing W. FINEGOLD, ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION 5 (1964)).
3. It is difficult to provide completely accurate figures on the use of artificial insemi-
nation in the United States because doctors have not had to report this procedure, are
reluctant to keep records of their work, or are unwilling to release this information in the
interest of donor anonymity. See Note, The Need for Statutes Regulating Artificial Insemination
by Donors, 46 OlIo ST. L.J. 1055, 1056 (1985). An estimate is that there are 20,000 artifi-
cially inseminated children born each year, of which 1,500 are born to unmarried women.
Vetri, Reproductive Technologies and United States Law, 37 INT'L & COMP. L.Q 505, 507 (1988);
Note, Reproductive Technology and the Procreation Rights of the Unmarried, 98 HARV. L. REV. 669,
671 (1985). An estimated 250,000 people in the Unites States alone have been conceived
by artificial insemination, and it has been projected that an additional 1.5 million children
will be conceived through this procedure by the end of the century. Comment, The Need for
Regulation of Artficial Insemination by Donor, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1193, 1194 (1985).
4. See Kritchevsky, The Unmarried Woman's Right to Artificial Insemination: A Call for an
Expanded Definition of Family, 4 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 2 (1981); Comment, supra note 3,
at 1196.
5. Artificial insemination may be performed in three ways: AID, where the sperm
from a donor is used; AIH, artificial insemination by husband, where the recipient's hus-
band is the sperm donor; and AIC, where semen from the husband and an unrelated do-
nor are combined. Comment, Artifcial Insemination and Surrogate Motherhood - A Nursery
Full o] Unresolved Questions, 17 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 913, 916-18 (1981).
6. Note, supra note 2, at 793.
7. See Patt, A Pathfinder on Artfiial Insemination, 8 LEGAL REFERENCE SERVS. Q, 117,
123-30 (1988).
8. Bishop, The Brave New World of Baby Making, 6 CAL. LAw. 37, 38 (Aug. 1986).
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known donor. Finally, the donor, married or unmarried, may be the
party seeking parental rights.
The existing AID legislation does not provide clear guidelines for
all parties involved in these non-traditional situations. 9 To a great ex-
tent, the legal rights and obligations of the parties involved in these
non-traditional situations have not been judicially resolved.
This Comment explores the current legal status in Colorado of AID
procedures involving known semen donors and unmarried recipients.
Specifically, this Comment focuses on the recent Colorado Supreme
Court decision, In the Interest of R.C., Minor Child,l 0 and the court's inter-
pretation of Colorado's AID statute."
This Comment initially reviews the Colorado AID statute. It then
reviews the facts of the instant case and the reasoning employed by the
court. Next, it analyzes the holding in terms of its legal and practical
effects on unmarried recipients and known donors. Finally, this Com-
ment suggests a statutory solution to help resolve the present uncer-
tainty regarding the legal ramifications of AID involving unmarried
recipients and known donors.
II. COLORADO AID STATUTE
Colorado's AID statute is found in § 19-4-106, 8B C.R.S. (Supp.
1988) of the Colorado Uniform Parentage Act ("Colorado UPA"). Sec-
tion 19-4-106 provides:
19-4-106. ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION.
(1) If, under the supervision of a licensed physician and
with the consent of her husband, a wife is inseminated artifi-
cially with semen donated by a man not her husband, the hus-
band is treated in law as if he were the natural father of a child
thereby conceived. The husband's consent must be in writing
and signed by him and his wife. The physician shall certify
their signatures and the date of the insemination and shall file
the husband's consent with the department of health, where it
shall be kept confidential and in a sealed file; however, the phy-
sician's failure to do so does not affect the father and child rela-
tionship. All papers and records pertaining to the
insemination, whether part of the permanent record of a court
or of a file held by the supervising physician or elsewhere, are
subject to inspection only upon an order of the court for good
cause shown.
(2) The donor of semen provided to a licensed physician
for use in artificial insemination of a woman other than the do-
nor's wife is treated in law as if he were not the natural father of
a child thereby conceived.12
This statute is based on section 5 of the Model Uniform Parentage
9. Note, supra note 2, at 793.
10. 775 P.2d 27 (Colo. 1989).
11. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-106 (Supp. 1988).
12. Id.
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Act ("Model UPA")13 as approved by the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws in 1973. Colorado adopted its ver-
sion of the Model UPA in July 1977 with the passage of House Bill No.
1584.14 The stated purpose of the Colorado UPA was to codify most
common law presumptions concerning paternity and to establish proce-
dures for the bringing of an action to determine the existence of a father
and child relationship. 15
With the exception of the omission of the word "married" in sub-
section (2), 16 § 19-4-106 is a verbatim reproduction of section 5 of the
Model UPA. There is nothing in the legislative tapes or files which indi-
cates why the Colorado General Assembly omitted the word "married"
from subsection (2) when the bill was originally introduced.
III. INSTANT CASE
A. Facts: In the Interest of R.C., Minor Child 17
In 1985,J.R., an unmarried man, donated semen to E.C., an unmar-
ried woman he had known since 1983. E.C. used a licensed physician to
inseminate her, became pregnant and bore a child, R.C., in 1986.
Shortly after the child was born, E.C. told J.R. that § 19-4-106(2)
extinguished his right to be treated as the father of R.C. Within a few
months J.R. instituted a paternity action alleging that, at the time of his
donation of semen, he and E.C. had agreed thatJ.R. would be treated as
the father of any child so conceived.
In his petition, J.R. alleged that E.G. had solicited the donation of
his semen; that he donated the semen only because E.C. promised that
J.R. would be treated as the natural father of any child conceived by the
artificial insemination; that there had been financial and emotional in-
volvement by him before and after the birth of R.C.; that E.C. knew of
and encouragedJ.R.'s conduct; and that he intended to retain a parental
relationship with R.C. at the timeJ.R. donated his semen.' 8
13. The Model UPA was enacted in 1973 largely in response to United States
Supreme Court decisions regarding the rights of unmarried parents and their offspring.
Note, supra note 2, at 796. The Model UPA's aim is to equalize the rights of legitimate and
illegitimate children, and its provisions are applicable regardless of the marital status of
the parents. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, Commissioners' Prefatory Note, 9B U.L.A. 287
(1987).
14. Ch. 245, §§ 1-3, §§ 19-6-101 to -129, 1977 Colo. Sess. Laws 1010, 1011-12 (now
codified at §§ 19-4-101 to -129, 8B C.R.S. (Supp. 1988)). The portion of House Bill No.
1584 dealing with AID was introduced and passed without change using language identical
to the present § 19-4-106. When adopted, the Colorado AID statute was numbered § 19-
6-106. The general assembly repealed and reenacted § 19-6-106 in 1978 and 1987. It was
renumbered in 1987 and can be found in the 1988 Supp. as § 19-4-106. See 775 P.2d at
31.
15. Uniform Parentage Act: Hearing on H. B. 1584 Before the House Judiciary Committee, 51 st
G.A., 1st Sess. (1977) (statement of Rep. Eckelberry).
16. Model UPA § 5(2) provides: "The donor of semen provided to a licensed physi-
cian for use in artificial insemination of a married woman other than the donor's wife is
treated in law as if he were not the natural father of a child thereby conceived." (emphasis
added).
17. 775 P.2d 27 (Colo. 1989).
18. J.R. additionally alleged that he had always wanted to be a father; that when he
1990]
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E.C. denied all of J.R.'s allegations and filed a motion for summary
judgement, contending that § 19-4-106(2) extinguished whatever rights
J.R. might have claimed as the biological father. E.C. argued that be-
cause the statutory prerequisites were met,19 J.R. must be treated in law
as if he were not the natural father of R.C. She claimed that evidence
surrounding any agreement of the parties at the time he donated the
semen was legally irrelevant because § 19-4-106 did not provide for con-
sideration of such evidence.
20
In his response, J.R. claimed that § 19-4-106(2) does not apply to
known semen donors and unmarried recipients who mutually agree that
the donor would retain his status as legal father of any child conceived
through AID. He argued that evidence surrounding the agreement be-
tween J.R. and E.C. at the time of AID was relevant under the common
law theory of promissory estoppel. He further argued that if § 19-4-
106(2) renders evidence surrounding the agreement of the parties irrel-
evant, then the statute as applied would violate the equal protection and
due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions.
2'
TheJuvenile Court, City and County of Denver, expressly found the
statute constitutional and concluded that, regardless of any agreement,
the statute extinguished any rightJ.R. may have had to be treated as the
father of R.C. 2 2 The court did not address J.R.'s promissory estoppel
claim.
23
J.R. appealed to the Colorado Court of Appeals. Because of the
public importance of the issues presented, the appeal was transferred
from the court of appeals to the supreme court pursuant to Colorado
Appellate Rule 50(a)(3).
24
The Colorado Supreme Court, in a majority opinion authored by
Justice Vollack, held that an agreement between a known semen donor
and an unmarried recipient at the time of artificial insemination is rele-
vant in determining the donor's parental rights with respect to a child so
conceived, despite the existence of a statute which normally cuts off the
parental rights of semen donors.2 5 Accordingly, the case was remanded
for a hearing on the evidence surrounding the issue of an agreement.
26
learned E.C. was pregnant, he bought clothing, toys and books for R.C.; that he opened a
college trust fund for R.C. and furnished a room in his house as a nursery; that he pro-
vided for R.C. in the event of his (J.R.'s) death; that he attended birthing classes with E.C.;
that he was a guest of honor at E.C.'s baby showers; that he assisted in the delivery of R.C.;
that he occasionally handled night feedings of R.C.; and that he took care of E.C. and R.C.
on a daily basis during the first week of R.C.'s life. Id. at 28.
19. J.R. had conceded in his pleadings that he was a donor of semen, that E.C.'s gyne-
cologist was a licensed physician, that he was not married to E.C., and that he provided
semen for use in E.C.'s artificial insemination. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 28-29.
22. Id. at 29.
23. Id.
24. C.A.R. 50(a)(3) (1984).
25. 775 P.2d at 35.
26. Id.
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B. Reasoning
1. Majority Opinion
According to the majority, the issue as presented was whether an
agreement between a known donor and unmarried recipient that the do-
nor would be the natural father of the child conceived through artificial
insemination is a relevant consideration in determining parental rights
under § 19-4-106.27 The court resolved the case on the basis of statu-
tory interpretation 2 8 and therefore declined to address the common law
and constitutional issues.29 In reaching its decision, the court looked to
the AID statute of the Model UPA, the legislative history of Colorado's
AID statute, legal commentaries analyzing the rights of parties in AID,
and cases concerning AID involving known donors and unmarried
recipients.
The court first considered the role of an agreement as contem-
plated by the Model UPA. In reviewing the AID section of the Model
UPA, the court noted that section 5 of the Model UPA was never in-
tended to answer all questions concerning the rights of participants in
artificial insemination. 30 The commentary to section 5 states:
This Act does not deal with many complex and serious
legal problems raised by the practice of artificial insemination.
It was though [sic] useful, however, to single out and cover in
this Act at least one fact situation that occurs frequently. Fur-
ther consideration of other legal aspects of artificial insemina-
tion has been urged on the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and is recommended to
state legislators.
3 '
The court determined that section 5 of the Model UPA resolves the
specific legal conflict between a semen donor and the recipient's hus-
band.3 2 Consistent with the core premises of the Model UPA,3 3 the
court stated that the drafters of the Model UPA plainly envisioned that
an agreement between the donor and a married recipient regarding the
donor's parental rights would be irrelevant because the married recipi-
ent's husband is treated in law as if he were the natural father.3 4 The
court also recognized that, as a practical matter, an agreement would
not be a relevant consideration when the semen donor is anonymous. 3 5
The court decided, however, that both section 5 of the Model UPA
and § 19-4-106 fail to provide statutory definition of the rights and du-
27. Id. at 33.
28. Id. at 35.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 30.
31. UNIF. PARENTAGE AcT § 5, Commissioners' Comment, 9B U.L.A. 302 (1987).
32. 775 P.2d at 30.
33. See Donovan, The Uniform Parentage Act and Nonmarital Motherhood-By-Choice, I I
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 193, 217 (1982-83).
34. 775 P.2d at 33.
35. Id.
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ties of the parties outside of the married recipient context.3 6 It there-
fore concluded that § 19-4-106 is ambiguous in this respect.
3 7
The court acknowledged the debate over the issue of whether sec-
tion 5 of the Model UPA was intended to extinguish parental rights of
semen donors known to the recipient. It observed that a number of
legal commentaries have suggested that the intent of the known donor
and unmarried recipient should be relevant to a determination of paren-
tal rights under the Model UPA.
38
The court next considered decisions from other jurisdictions to
gain insight into the role of an agreement in determining parental rights
of known semen donors and unmarried recipients involved in artificial
insemination. Prior to the instant case, only two jurisdictions had deter-
mined the rights of known donors and unmarried recipients concerning
children conceived through AID.3 9 The court noted that in both cases
the intent of the parties was a relevant consideration in determining
whether the known donor's parental rights were extinguished.
40
The first case, C.M. v. C.C.,4 was decided in 1977, before the state
of New Jersey enacted an AID statute. That case involved a known do-
nor giving semen to an unmarried recipient who artificially inseminated
herself without the aid of a licensed physician. The court determined
that the donor had intended to act as a parent and that when the child
was conceived there was no other party in a position to take on the re-
sponsibility of fatherhood. 4 2 Relying on public policy that it was in "the
child's best interest to have two parents whenever possible,"'43 the court
concluded that the donor was entitled to visitation rights with respect to
the resulting child.
4 4
The more recent case,Jhordan C. v. Mary K ,45 involved the interpre-
tation in 1986 by the California Court of Appeal of an AID statute
46
identical to § 19-4-106. There the court determined that, unlike the
Model UPA, the California AID statute applies to unmarried recipi-
ents.4 7 However, it concluded that because the recipient did not obtain
the semen directly from a licensed physician as required by statute, the
statute did not apply and therefore the donor was not precluded from
36. Id. at 34.
37. Id.
38. See Andrews, Legal Aspects of New Reproductive Technologies, 29 CLINICAL OBSTETRICS
& GYNECOLOGY 190, 200 (1986); Kern & Ridolfi, supra note 2, at 256; Vetri, supra note 3, at
514; Note, supra note 2, at 806; see also In Re Marriage of Adams, 174 Ill. App. 3d 595, 610-
11, 528 N.E.2d 1075, 1084 (1988); Andrews, LegalAspects of Assisted Reproduction, 54 ANNALS
N.Y. ACAD. Sci. 668, 674 (1988).
39. 775 P.2d at 31-32.
40. Id. at 34.
41. 152 N.J. Super. 160, 377 A.2d 821 (1977).
42. Id. at -, 377 A.2d at 824.
43. Id. at -, 377 A.2d at 825.
44. Id. at -, 377 A.2d at 825.
45. 179 Cal. App. 3d 386, 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (1986).
46. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7005(b) (West 1983).
47. 179 Cal. App. at 392, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 534.
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establishing paternity. 4 8
Based upon these cases and its review of legislative history and legal
commentaries, the Colorado Supreme Court stated that:
The primary purpose of § 19-4-106 is to provide a legal
mechanism for married and unmarried recipients to obtain a
supply of semen for use in artificial insemination and, in the
case of married recipients, to make clear that the legal rights
and duties of fatherhood are borne by the recipient's husband
rather than the donor.
49
The court agreed with the Jhordan C. court that an unmarried woman
does not lose the protection of the AID statute merely because she
knows the donor, 50 and that the AID statute protects semen donors
from unanticipated child support obligations. 5 1 However, the court
concluded that the general assembly neither considered nor intended to
affect the rights of known donors who gave their semen to unmarried
recipients for use in AID with an agreement that the donor would be the
father of any child so conceived. The court thus held the AID statute
inapplicable in this circumstance.
52
Because the court concluded that § 19-4-106 does not apply when
the known semen donor and the unmarried recipient agree that the
known donor will have parental rights and expressly agree at the time of
insemination that he will be treated as the natural father of any child so
conceived, it held that an agreement is relevant to whetherJ.R.'s paren-
tal rights were extinguished through the artificial insemination pro-
cess. 53 The court held that if no such agreement was present at the time
of insemination, then § 19-4-106(2) would operate to extinguish J.R.'s
parental rights and duties concerning R.C. Conversely, if such an agree-
ment was present, then § 19-4-106(2) would not operate to extinguish
J.R.'s parental rights and duties concerning R.C., and the juvenile court
must determine parental rights based on the terms of the agreement.
54
2. Concurring Opinion
Justice Kirshbaum filed a special concurrence. 5 5 He disagreed with
the majority's suggestion that the issue was whether the general assem-
bly intended § 19-4-106(2) to apply to a donor who had an agreement
with the donee that, contrary to the statute's provisions, the donor
should be treated as the child's father. He stated that such an interpre-
tation could suggest that the meaning of statutory terms can vary de-
pending on private agreements and that legislative intent could
therefore vary from case to case depending on the frame of mind of
48. Id. at 398, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 537-38.
49. 775 P.2d at 30.
50. Id. at 35.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. (KirshbaumJ., concurring).
1990]
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persons governed by that intent.5 6 He phrased the issue as whether par-
ties whose rights are governed by statute may waive those rights by
agreement.
57
Justice Kirshbaum also did not accept the majority's suggestion that
the drafters of the Model UPA envisioned that the only time an agree-
ment by the parties would not be a relevant consideration in ascertain-
ing the meaning of the statute is when the donee is married and her
husband consents in writing to the artificial insemination. 58 He rea-
soned that if the meaning of a statute in some but not all of its applica-
tions must be determined by reference to the intent of persons
governed thereunder, the statute may not meet equal protection or due
process standards. 59
It was Justice Kirshbaum's opinion that subsection (2) of the statute
must be read in conjunction with subsection (1), which requires that the
artificial insemination statute be committed to the supervision of a li-
censed physician. 60 Noting that the general assembly did not define the
scope of supervision required of the licensed physician in the AID pro-
cess, he reasoned that a common law standard of reasonable profes-
sional care is implied. 6 1 He stated that if the artificial insemination of
E.C. was not properly supervised by a licensed physician as contem-
plated by subsection (2), the statute would not apply to bar J.R. from
establishing the existence of an agreement. Because the trial court did
not consider the question of adequate physician supervision, he would
have remanded the case for such a determination. 6 2
IV. ANALYSIS
Section 19-4-106(2) provides that the (1) donor of semen, (2) pro-
vided to a licensed physician, (3) for use in artificial insemination, (4) of
a woman other than the donor's wife, (5) is treated in law as if he were
not the natural father of any child so conceived. 63
The plain language of the statute seems to contemplate the situa-
tion involving a known donor and unmarried woman. Nonetheless, the
supreme court concluded that the legislature never intended to address
this situation and found subsection (2) ambiguous in the context of a
known donor and unmarried woman. 64 The court went on to conclude
that unmarried as well as married women share in the protection pro-
vided by subsection (2) and that known donors are protected under sub-
section (2) from unanticipated child support obligations. 6 5 However,
56. Id. at 35-36 (Kirshbaum J., concurring).
57. Id. at 36 (Kirshbaum J., concurring).
58. Id. (Kirshbaum J., concurring).
59. Id. (Kirshbaum J., concurring).
60. Id. (Kirshbaum J. concurring).
61. Id. at 37 (Kirshbaum J., concurring).
62. Id. (Kirshbaum J., concurring).
63. See supra text accompanying note 12.
64. See supra text accompanying notes 36-37.
65. See supra text accompanying notes 50-51.
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the court ruled that subsection (2) was never intended to affect the
rights of known donors when there is an agreement covering the do-
nor's parental rights regarding a child so conceived. 6 6
There is nothing evident in the plain language of the statute to sup-
port the court's conclusion that the general assembly intended to distin-
guish between known and unknown donors. Moreover, there is nothing
in subsection (2) that refers to the effect an agreement would have on
the application of the statute. To rationalize looking beyond the plain
language of the statute, the court recites one legal commentary's state-
ment of the core policy considerations of the Model UPA: guaranteeing
substantive legal equality for all children as well as identifying the father
and enforcing the child's rights against him.67 The court appears to
have focused on the latter part of these stated policy considerations:
identifying the father and enforcing the child's rights against him.
Perhaps the court was troubled that neither the statutory language
nor legislative history specifically address the rights of known donors,
and that if the word "donor" is construed as known or unknown, appli-
cation of the plain language of the statute would result in the elimina-
tion of any possibility of a man acquiring parental rights outside of
wedlock. Such a result would run contrary to caselaw existing prior to
the Model UPA68 and could be unconstitutional. 69
The decision of the court, however, does not clarify the rights and
duties of an unmarried recipient and a known donor. Under the court's
holding, by asserting that there was a pre-insemination agreement, a
known donor can always bring a custody suit against a mother, and an
unmarried mother can always bring a child support action against a
known donor. As a practical consequence of the court's ruling, in every
action brought by either a known donor or an unmarried mother, the
party seeking to avoid application of the statute will be able to preclude
summary judgment by asserting the existence of a pre-insemination
agreement. Therefore, such cases will invariably go to trial, unnecessa-
rily involving the court's time and increasing the costs to the parties.
The court's statement that unmarried women are protected under the
statute 70 falters under the practical application of its holding.
The Colorado Supreme Court stated that the purpose of § 19-4-106
is to provide a mechanism for all women to obtain a supply of semen for
use in artificial insemination. 7 1 However, the court's holding has a
questionable impact on the artificial insemination process in regard to
both unmarried women and known donors. Because of the possibility of
litigation, unmarried women may be reluctant to be artificially insemi-
66. See supra text accompanying notes 52-54.
67. 775 P.2d at 33; see Donovan, supra note 33, at 217.
68. See UNIF. PARENTAGE AcT, Commissioners' Prefatory Note, 9B U.L.A. 287-90
(1987).
69. Id.
70. See supra text accompanying note 50.
71. See supra text accompanying note 49.
1990)
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nated and men may be reluctant to be known donors. This chilling ef-
fect would undermine many of the purposes of Colorado's AID statute.
In situations where AID involves an unmarried recipient and known
donor, the increased occurrence of litigation seems unavoidable. To
remedy this situation, a legislative amendment to Colorado's AID stat-
ute must be made to clarify the rights and duties of all parties involved.
The statute should state that the donor has no rights or duties to the
child unless the parties agree otherwise in writing. The written agree-
ment could be filed with the physician performing the AID, similar to
the present subsection (1) requirement regarding filing and maintaining
of records pertaining to the insemination of a married woman and her
husband. 72 This would protect the unmarried mother from defending
an unanticipated paternity action and the known donor from defending
an unanticipated child support action.
A similar approach has been adopted in the states of New Jersey
73
and Washington. 74 For example, NewJersey's AID statute, § 9:17-44(b)
provides that "unless the donor of semen and the woman have entered
into a written contract to the contrary, the donor of semen provided to a
licensed physician for use in artificial insemination of a woman other
than the donor's wife is treated in law as if he were not the father of a
child thereby conceived .... .75 While this language severs the legal
relationship between the unmarried recipient and known donor when
there is no written agreement, it also allows an unmarried woman and
known donor to agree that the donor will have a role as a father, and
provides for rights and responsibilities of the parties.
7 6
Modifying subsection (2) of Colorado's AID statute to include the
requirement of a written contract would serve to ensure that both the
recipient and donor, when the provisions of the statute are met, would
be protected against future intervention by a party desiring to redefine
his or her rights and obligations. 77 Parties who enter into a pre-insemi-
nation contract would be held to the terms of that contract.
This contract approach is not without inherent uncertainty. Both
the California Court of Appeal inJhordan C.7 8 and Justice Kirshbaum in
his concurrence in the instant case 7 9 recognized the questionable en-
forceability of such an agreement between the parties. However, the
enforceability of a contract in an AID situation is analogous to the en-
forceability of a contract in an adoption situation. Just as the biological
parents are not permitted to change their minds after they have exe-
72. See supra text accompanying note 12.
73. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44(b) (West Supp. 1989).
74. WASH. REv. CODE § 26.26.050(2) (1986).
75. Supra note 73. It is noteworthy that this AID statute was passed by the NewJersey
General Assembly subsequent to the decision by the NewJersey Superior Court in the case
of C.M. v. C.C., supra note 41.
76. See Vetri, supra note 3, at 515.
77. See Kritchevsky, supra note 4, at 40-4 1; Note, supra note 2, at 808.
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cuted a waiver of their rights at the time of adoption, 80 neither should
the parties in AID be permitted to change their minds after insemina-
tion. A post-insemination repudiation of the contract would be to the
detriment of all parties involved. Subsequent controversies over cus-
tody, visitation, support and such matters as the child's education and
religion might disrupt the lives of the child and all members of the
planned family.
A modification to Colorado's AID statute would clarify the legal
rights and duties of all parties in the AID situation. Furthermore, it
would be a tacit recognition by the legislature that it is not always in the
best interest of a child to have two parents. Moreover, it would serve
the core policy considerations of the UPA.
V. CONCLUSION
For Colorado's AID law to remain relevant to today's society, it
must progress as society progresses. By adding the element of an agree-
ment, the Colorado Supreme Court has limited the application of Colo-
rado's AID statute. This change leaves § 19-4-106 with the narrow
application recognized by the Model UPA drafters as an inherent limita-
tion of section 5 of the Model UPA. 8 1 It leaves uncertain the legal status
of unmarried recipients, known donors and their offspring.
There are many variations to the traditional family scenario. The
laws of Colorado must recognize these alternate lifestyles and keep pace
with the demands of modern reproductive technology. It is undeniable
that numerous unmarried recipients and known donors participate in
the AID procedure, most likely unaware of the potential legal ramifica-
tions associated with it. To avoid confusion over the rights and duties of
these parties and to serve the core policy considerations of the Model
UPA, the Colorado General Assembly must act. The rights and duties of
unmarried recipients and known donors involved in the AID process
must be delineated.
Elizabeth A. Bryant
80. See Note, supra note 2, at 805.
81. See supra text accompanying notes 31-36.
1990]

